EX PARTE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

DECLARATION OF INDIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

1. Because of my poverty, I am unable to pay any cost related to this case.
2. I am not presently employed in any enterprise which returns me a financial recompense, and I have taken a vow of poverty for religious reasons.
3. During the past thirteen years I have not received any money from business, profession or form of self-employment, rent payments,interest dividends, pensions, annuities, life insurance payments, gifts or inheritances. The only money I have received during the past thirteen years has been in the form of small unsolicited donations, all of which has been spent on literature and other supplies in connection with my communicative activities.
4. I have no money in a checking or savings accounts.
5. I own no real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles, or other valuable property.
6. I have no dependents. Under penalty of perjury, this 15th day of March, 1996,

ORDER

FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MOTION TO INTERVENE AS A DEFENDANT

Moreover, the Complaint alleges, "The "Rainbow Guide of 1995, Summer Edition' indicates that the Forest Service group use regulations are unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Attachment 1." ( Id. para. 22), and Thomas' address and phone number appears under the unconstitutional allegations of which the Forest Service complains (Plaintiff's Attachment 1, inside rear cover, compare, Declaration of William Thomas, filed this date), wherefor, plaintiff is likely to attempt to hold Thomas personally liable under plaintiffs' claim for relief (D). the page of plaintiff's Attachment 1, as such Thomas has a defense to plaintiff's claim presenting both questions of law and of fact which are common to the main action.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

DECLARATION OF WILLIAM THOMAS

1. My religion is devotion to pursuit of Truth, Justice, Freedom and Equality, which I believe to be "the things of the Kingdom of Heaven." Luke, 12: 31; Matthew 6: 33; John, 18: 36.
2. I believe that through reason, thought, and expression humanity can draw closer to understanding the ways of God. Isaiah 1: 18.
3. Based on my belief in a God of reason, the most significant exercise of my religion is to assemble fellow seekers of Truth, Justice, Freedom and Equality. Matthew 18: 20; Acts 2: 44.
4. My association with the Rainbow Family began and has continued as a result of the regulatory scheme that culminated in the amendments to 36 CFR 251 and 261, which are the subject of this suit. In my opinion these regulations are a serious threat to freedom of thought, expression, assembly, and, as such, constitute an insult to the principles of my devotion (supra, =B6 1), and those "self evident truths" upon which this nation was founded.
5. My involvement in the aforesaid scheme has consisted in assembling and disseminating information regarding the procedure of the scheme to interested individuals.
6. As a result of my efforts to prevent the Forest Service from criminalizing the ancient right of free assembly on public lands, .my address, P.O. Box 27217, Washington, and telephone number 202-462-0757 appears under the constitutional opinions relied upon on the Complaint, i.e.: "The 'Rainbow Guide for 1995, Summer Edition' indicates that the forest Service group use regulations are unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Attachment 1." Complaint, =B6 22.
7. Owing to the intimate association of my personal address and telephone number with the legal opinions of which plaintiff complains, considering also that plaintiffs ask the Court to "Order the defendants to take such affirmative actions as to provide notice of the injunction to Rainbow Family members inform all means of available public and private media and to inform all members of the Rainbow Family that a violation of the injunction is punishable by contempt of this court," my personal interests are imperiled by plaintiff's action.
8. A federal court determination as to whether a federal regulation, applicable to all federal forests in the United States, does, or does not, "comply with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and (is) otherwise legally valid," will seriously affect my personal interests.
9. Although page 3 of Complaint Attachment 1 states, "If you have a belly button, you can be a Rainbow," notwithstanding the fact that I have a belly button, I am not representing myself as a member of the Rainbow Family, but only as an individual concerned with freedom of thought, expression and assembly.
10. I certainly have no authority, nor can I honestly profess, to represent any interests the which purported "Rainbow Family class" may, or may not, have.
11. I reaffirm, under penalty of perjury, and applicable statutes, that the foregoing is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and recollection.

MOTION TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

The "named" defendants are not typical of any class; and represent only themselves. As individuals, they can not protect the interests of the named "Defendant Class." On the contrary, plaintiff only offers the "Rainbow Guide 1995, Summer Edition." Complaint, =B6 22 and Attachment 1.

Plaintiff does not specify that the "Rainbow Guide 1995, Summer Edition" -- the only purported link between the Complaint, "the class," and reality, -- lists any of the "named defendants." As plaintiff has gone to the trouble of affixing the "Rainbow Guide 1995, Summer Edition," to the Complaint, at a minimum, plaintiff should have taken the obvious step of serving the members of the purported class.

At worst, the Complaint alleges, that the named defendants were part of a group "who gather(ed) together in the national forests to celebrate peace and harmony with nature and =B7with one another." Assuming that allegation is true, and construing it in a light most favorable to plaintiff, any personnel association of the named defendants is at best a connection of various spiritual beliefs subject to protection under the Freedom of Religion Act of 1993.

While it is certainly true that "information and belief" might lead one to the good faith conclusion that the moon is made of cream cheese, Rule 23 requires that "representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." The Complaint is affixed to the "Rainbow Family Guide 1995, Summer Edition," however, it offers no support for an assumption that the "named defendants" are members of the asserted "Rainbow Family class," nor that the named defendants would fairly or adequately protect the interests of "The Rainbow Family. a/k/a Rainbow Nation, aka Rainbow Family of Living Light, a/k/a Gathering of Tribes, the Rainbow Family Vision Council, the Rainbow Family Tribal Council, the Rainbow Family Council, (or) unknown Members"

PLAINTIFF LACKS STANDING TO BRING THIS COMPLAINT

Amazingly, perhaps, in its brief Factual Background section (=B6=B6 16= -23) the Complaint bemoans nothing more than the facts that

(1) between approximately February 2 - 6, 1996, U.S. Forest Ranger Keith Lawrence "met with" various individuals, "including one named Jose,"
(2) "provided (an unspecified number of) individual(s) with a printed notice, stating that non commercial activities involving more than 75 people require a permit,
(3) a few additional notices were posted at various bathroom facilities,
(4) there were more than 75 people in Osceola National Forest, "on or abound February 5 to February 6, 1996,"
(5) "the Rainbow Family (had not) given any indication that (a permit) application w(ould) be filed,
(6) "(t)he 'Rainbow Guide for 1995, summer Edition' indicates that the Forest Service group use regulations are unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." See, generally, Complaint, =B6=B6 16 -23.

(1) "injury in fact," by which we mean an invasion of a legally protected interest that is "(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical," Lujan, supra, 504 U.S., at ----, 112 S.Ct., at 2136 (citations, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted);
(2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, by which we mean that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant," and has not resulted "from the independent action of some third party not before the court," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1926, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976); and
(3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision, by which we mean that the "prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling" is not "too speculative," Allen v. Wright, supra, 468 U.S., at 752, 104 S.Ct., at 3325. These elements are the "irreducible minimum," Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982), required by the Constitution." Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v.City of Jacksonville, Florida, et al.,113 S.CT. 2297, 2301 (1993).

Here, where plaintiff hasn't offered so much "conjectural or hypothetical" (with the possible exception of hurt feelings) injury, much less a "causal relationship between" any "concrete and particularized" injury, it is obvious that plaintiff is merely pestering this honorable Court for a declaration of the variety which the Circuit has recently indicated is inappropriate. "In this case, because no legal remedies are available to plaintiffs a verdict in their favor would do little more than provide them with emotional satisfaction Such satisfaction is not an appropriate remedy under these circumstances. See also Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172-73, 97 S.Ct. 1739, 1740, 52 L.Ed.2d 219 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that a claim is moot when the primary interest is the emotional satisfaction from a favorable ruling)." Lankford; et al. v. City of Hobart; et. al, 73 F.3d 283, 288 (1996).

ANY ISSUES PLAINTIFF MAY HAVE IMAGINED ARE MOOT

The complaint seeks relief for a gathering which allegedly began "in approximately the last week of January or the first week of February, 1996," and, was purported "to run through the week of February 26. 1996. Complaint paragraph, 16.

Plaintiff does not assert that whatever happened ended over two weeks ago. Further, the complaint does not allege that a "gathering" ever before occurred in the Osceola National Forest, nor does it contain a wispy indication that any= similar "gathering" is likely ever to happen there again. Yet, in sum, the plaintiff seeks an order to enjoin the "Rainbow Family" from "intentionally and knowingly failing to apply for a special use authorization under 36 C.F.R. =A7 251" Complaint, =B6 25, COUNT I (the only Count).

These distinctions are particularly significant in a case like this, where plaintiff is seeking a declaration that "a ... regulations concerning noncommercial group uses of the national forests, are valid under the United States Constitution." Consistently over the years, the Supreme Court has adhered to a strict rule regarding decisions on constitutional issues. "(C)onstitutional issues affecting legislation will not be determined ... in broader terms than are required by the precise facts to which the ruling is to be applied. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 569 (1947). the Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation ... it is necessary to do so to preserve the rights of the parties" Coffman v. Breeze, 323 U.S. 316, 324-25 (1945). Courts are "bound by two rules, to which it has rigidly adhered, one, never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it; the other never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied." New York and Philadelphis S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885).

Hence, since there is no "live controversy," the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to render what, on either the injunctive or the declaratory relief sought, would amount to an advisory opinion. See, Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 59 L. Ed. 2d 642, 99 S. Ct. 1379 (1979); Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc. v. United States, 281 U.S. App. D.C. 306, 889 F.2d 1139,1142-43 (D.C. Cir. 1989). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons the Complaint in this matter should be dismissed, with prejudice.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE