/\_WyFire Report, Pt.2
[ "GATHERING FIRE IN WYOMING (July '94) / Facts & Issues Summary" -- ]
[ Pt.2 of 2: 'Perspectives' on The Fire And FS Actions, ]
[ Inactions, & Politics... Conclusions, Footnotes, Affirmation ]
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** PERSPECTIVES
* Actions & Reactions...
Overall, what the Forest Service DID and SAID in this incident raises
immediate issues of performance, and bigger issues of policy.
In the first place, if "Incident Command" has any legitimate mandates
to prepare for real problems and coordinate public resources in response,
it failed to fulfill this role in Wyoming.
The fire hazard posed by this site was well-known in advance of the
gathering. The Rainbow Family's "Wyoming Rap 107" was distributed widely,
with strong advisories and detailed instructions on fire prevention:
Logically the Forest Service should have anticipated and prepared for this
possibility as the greatest danger by far. Yet only three federal
firefighters (two from the FS, one from BLM) were on-hand in the Big Piney
area for emergency response; the only available equipment was a single BLM
pickup truck, parked on the road with routine gear for their use.{23}
Furthermore, almost no effort was made to communicate with gatherers
and coordinate resources in support of the fire fight -- even after the two
"fire/medical evacuation councils" between gatherers and officials, where
supposedly the channels were set up. When the fire started Shantisena
volunteers tried to establish radio contact with the IC Team, but they got
little feedback and almost no cooperation. The only information provided
at-large was that the tanker plane was being sent from Salt Lake City, with
false information on when it would arrive.{24}
While official communication & action broke down, there was good
cooperation in the gathering, and some well-coordinated responses evolved.
>From the outset, people helped as needed on evacuating the woods, sending
tools to the fire crews, collecting buckets at the spring, childcare, radio
contacts, etc. -- all at once. Later in the day, kitchens sent hot food
and drinking water to the front lines.
Most telling is the fact that fire fight worked quite safely, with no
serious problems or injuries, and medical volunteers were on-hand and
prepared with pooled resources. There was one minor axe wound among the
gatherers working the fire, and a few people caught a bit too much smoke
and were pulled out by field medics for some good air and warm tea. In
fact the only serious first aid was required by a BLM firefighter who had
just stepped out of his truck and cut his leg with a chainsaw. He was
treated at "CALM" and then assisted off-site.{25}
* The Heat on Volunteers...
In fact Forest Service Law Enforcement Officers (LEO's, not
firefighters) were the first at the site (very quickly) and played the most
prominent and defining official presence -- mainly, obstructing volunteers
in their efforts, breaking up bucket lines, and threatening firefighters
with arrest if they stayed in the area.
Fortunately volunteers ignored the threats anyway, and continued to fight
the fire. Early in the blaze this writer was personally confronted &
warned by an officer on horseback, and had to simply respond: "Sorry Sir,
but the official response around here is pretty 'underwhelming'!" The
mounted LEO's were in no position to actually stop or arrest a lot of
people, but they continued to harass and intimidate volunteers throughout
the day -- in the first hours at the fire, and later around the Main
Meadow. Other officers closed the incoming road to the Gathering that
afternoon, probably contributing to some panic on the outside.
Officers justified these actions on the grounds that the fire area
was dangerous, on the authority to close National Forest lands for reasons
of public safety.
In net effect, this was an Official decision to do nothing and let the
fire burn.
In the judgment of Citizens on hand, such negligence and inaction posed a
far greater hazard to public safety and loss of resources, and they
exercised that judgment -- in defiance of authorities, in jeopardy of
prosecution by doing so.
In this light, the real outcome of this incident stands in stark paradox:
As dusk fell on July 3, the last hotspots and root burns had been
stomped and soaked down, a circle of tired people formed in the clearing
south of the burn. Volunteers discussed the situation and set up a fire
watch through the night. They also shared their feelings about the
extraordinary events of that day. The Incident Commander and two Federal
firefighters were there -- clearly affected by the emotions of the moment,
they expressed their sincere thanks and respect for the efforts of
gathering volunteers in stopping the fire.
Later an official who had witnessed the whole event gave his thoughts in
an interview, and called it 'amazing'. He lauded the gatherers for the
courage and good sense he saw: "In all [his] years he had never seen so
efficient an organizing effort" by citizens in a crisis situation.{26}
* Then Nothing Happened...
USFS Officials contributed little to solutions in a crisis, and then
failed to sub-stantially investigate or report real events... this raises
more questions:
The "Incident Command Team" was delegated as the official presence on
the scene, responsible for the content and posture of official reports,
with regard to the fire itself and the circumstances around it. There was
no question that full information was available to them: The day after the
July 3rd fire at Big Piney the Incident Commander was heard to observe that
it could have burned down 10,000 acres of Bridger National Forest, and that
it would have taken their fire crews up to a week to contain it, had it not
been for the Gatherers cooperating to stop it.{27} Similarly, USFS
officials received reliable reports on key facts, including a prime suspect
in custody, and many additional witnesses to draw upon for evidence.
Yet where the seriousness of the fire and the extraordinary outcome
were acknowledged verbally, they are not reflected in the Incident report:
As the official record of the event, it is misleading by several
assertions, and by many exclusions.
Circumstances warranted serious efforts to investigate fully,
apprehend known suspects, establish proof of cause, and explore motives and
possible complicity of other individuals or entities. Further, they had
ample grounds to represent the situation fairly in public information.
However by the actions of Forest Service Law Enforcement and Public
Information officials, the Agency seemed content to leave misconceptions in
the media and let the matter die of neglect. Where the full facts might
reflect poorly on Agency performance and purposes -- and mandate
fundamental policy changes -- the events of the Wyoming Fire are
trivialized, and the record is left distorted.
* The Regulatory Scheme...
The Wyoming Fire is especially poignant in the context of two Forest
Service regulations proposed in 1993-94 -- how they targeted the
gatherings, and why they were backfiring:
o The 'Group Use' regulations [36 CFR §251,261] were published as a
'notice-and-comment' rulemaking on 5/6/93, once again asserting a permit
requirement for "noncommercial group events" and "distribution of printed
material" in the National Forests. This was a re-write of similar rules
promulgated in the 1980's, after decisions by two Federal Courts that such
regulations were unconstitutional as applied to First Amendment events.{28}
Agency officials had stated the intention of publishing and
implementing the final rules very quickly after the close of public
comments in August, but advocates had forced delays by raising scrutiny in
Congress, civil liberties organizations, and high Administrative offices.
The third critical delay was in early May '94, after volunteers spoke
personally with Chief Jack Ward Thomas at USFS "Town Hall" meetings in St.
Paul, MN (4/30) and Washington, DC (5/6).
o New regulations on USFS 'Law Enforcement' [36 CFR §261,262] were
proposed on 2/16/94, with provisions to vastly expand police powers under
the auspices of USFS Law Enforcement & Investigations. Advocates did not
know about this for nearly a month -- halfway through the 60-day comment
period -- but quickly published information on this proposal. A
groundswell of public opposition arose, first forcing a 30-day extension of
the comment period.
Thereafter the Chief also heard about this rulemaking in St.
Paul and DC, angry letters poured into the comment record, and bipartisan
opposition sounded from Congress. On May 18 '94 -- the final day of public
comments -- the Chief stopped the 'Law Enforcement' proposal with apologies
to the public, saying that he had decided "not to proceed to a final rule",
and that "a new proposal will be developed" to revise existing
regulations.{29}
In a nutshell, USDA/Forest Service officials crafted these
rulemakings to assert unprecedented powers over "group events" and "public
behavior"; they had overplayed their hand, and these regulatory actions
were on the ropes by Spring '94. The issues were fundamental -- the
underlying authorities for new laws, and the boundaries of enforcement.
They were getting the message that people did not like what they were
doing.
Public response to the 'Law Enforcement' proposal was easy to
understand:
It created many new enforceable offenses with vague language and broad
discretions, and put normal recreational activities under close police
scrutiny. It was an obvious power grab, exceeding accepted limits of
jurisdiction, and it galvanized reactions across the political spectrum.
The libertarian Right and civil liberties Left were on the same side in
opposition. But the intent was clearly more narrow:
One citizen called the USFS LEI (Law Enforcement & Investigations)
office in Virginia to ask why so many normal activities would be turned
into crimes, and she was told not to worry... these rules were really
directed toward "large groups in the National Forests."
The grounds for a 'Group Use' restriction were also crumbling, but
these issues were more complex. The core question had been raised, it
remained unanswered, and the enactment of the rules had been set back and
frustrated as it kept coming up:
Why regulate, what 'significant government interest' was served?
* Pretexts for Power...
Based on their general mandate to regulate land use in the National
Forests, the Forest Service sought to define public gatherings as a
"special use" subject to permit authority. As such the rulemaking must
stand on the pretext that it serves public purposes of resource protection,
public safety, etc. But the underlying authority to extend this
jurisdiction over any activity depends on some showing that a real harm is
occurring, and that the proposed restriction has some 'rational basis' as a
means of mitigating that harm. In this regard, the core logic of the
'Group Use' proposal was flawed, at odds with the facts, and under attack:
In fact the Gatherings have a long history of good performance on public
health & safety, care & cleanup on the land. Where no "significant
impacts" have been demonstrated, there is no Use as defined by land law:
The threshold for regulation has not been crossed, so there is no basis for
any new restriction -- much less the preemptive enforcement powers they
were seeking through these rules.{30}
The test is more stringent where First Amendment events would be
affected. Speculating that such impacts might occur is not a legal
basis for new powers, especially where less restrictive means are available
and known to work. Forest Service personnel at local levels have
cooperated effectively with gatherings, so they have known this for years.
Apparently there were also deep divisions within the Forest Service over
whether these regulations were necessary or appropriate -- especially if
enforcement would take matters out of local Rangers' hands, and leave them
without authority or ability to work with the public in good faith.
This was the political backdrop going into the Wyoming Gathering: In
sum, by July '94 the USFS rulemaking cadre was hard-pressed from all sides
to show reasons for the new rules they wanted to impose. It is known that
government operatives have used covert tactics to create "incidents" in the
past... This is not an allegation that provocateurs were deployed in
Wyoming, but it is factual to observe that these agencies had this ability,
and the institutional incentive was there:
A major forest fire at the Rainbow Gathering in a National Forest would
have conveniently discredited the challenges, and justified vastly expanded
enforcement powers over First Amendment events as a natural extension of
agency purposes.
Of course the outcome was very different in Fact and Politics,
embarrassing to Forest Service competence and motives: The Rainbows
stopped the fire, did so on their own resources, while the responsible
Agencies were marginal at best.
It was an ironic contrast of 'freedom vs. control' in real problem-solving:
-- An unorganized assemblage of people achieved a high level of
organization in fast crisis response on many fronts, based on the core
workings of free Consensus:
Individuals seeing what needs to be done, and Doing it in mutual support.
-- Meanwhile the official 'Organization' faltered, bad decisions were
made, the chain of Command could not handle diverse information or
cooperate effectively:
People waiting for orders did not know what to do, & maybe some were out of
control.
It also disproved whole basis of the 'Group Use' rulemaking:
A consensual gathering operates on higher standards of land stewardship
and public safety than the hierarchy can impose in its own image. The
permit authority is thus irrelevant to the public purposes it claims,
destructive to demonstrated better means, and therefore without legal
grounds.
* Conclusions
The cause of the Gathering Fire in Wyoming remains unknown, and
cannot be determined with information revealed thus far. A definitive
physical investigation of the burn site could not be completed -- it was
disturbed by volunteers in the final phase of putting out the fire, and
remaining evidence could not be found intact.
However the full facts are not explained by attributing the fire to
mere accident or negligence on the part of gatherers; Official reports
were inaccurate and misleading in creating this impression. There are
facts strongly indicating arson as the cause, many witnesses to suspicious
persons & circumstances, and actions by USFS officials that were deceptive
& disruptive in response to the fire.
If arson is established as a possible cause, the analysis must look
to Motives for intimidating & discrediting a Rainbow Gathering, and the
Means to do so. It is believed by many that the Forest Service was behind
it, at least linked to the perpetrator; but it can only be observed that
certain officials had political incentives, contacts, and capabilities for
this. As such there may be suspects within the Agency, but not only there.
More facts are needed...
To the extent that the Forest Service has not pursued facts or
disclosed what they know -- or has deterred others from finding out more --
it is a coverup, and they are entirely culpable. It is their highest
trusteeship to assure that First Amendment activities in the National
Forests are not subjected to terror tactics from anywhere.
In sum, there are grounds for serious inquiry into the Wyoming Fire,
with focus on the cumulative failures of the Forest Service to prepare,
respond, or investigate appropriately where Public Land and Lives were
threatened.
Research and discovery are recommended in these three areas of concern:
[1] Explore how the USFS "Incident Command Team" was selected,
structured,
and briefed in advance of the Wyoming Gathering of July 1994.
What policy directives were given, and what strategic planning and
budget allocations were done to determine the agency personnel and
resources that would be on-hand for the event?
Identify prior communications and contracts with other agencies at all
levels of government, in particular the interagency ("Cooperative") law
enforcement agreements that were in effect for the Gathering.
[2] Examine the sequence of events and the pattern of official actions
when the Big Fire broke out on July 3rd.
What decisions were made on mobilizing firefighting personnel and
resources, receiving & transmitting tactical information, communicating
with gathering volunteers, supporting medical teams, controlling traffic,
etc.?
Especially critical in this regard are decisions on the deployment and
mission of Law Enforcement officers of all agencies, before and during the
fire incident.
[3] Determine the full extent of official investigations during the fire
& afterwards, and what may have been done to limit their scope.
Why was there no effort to conduct factfinding or witness interviews
on-site, nor to question known suspects about the fire? What were the
charges and proceedings on suspects apprehended by police, and the outcome
of the cases?
If the Agency failed to pursue substantial facts or withheld
information from the public, a credible investigation must now extend to
their actions.
________________________________________
______________________________
[FOOTNOTES:]
1 Witness {A}, via recorded statements; also {B} via phone.
2 {B}, via publication and personal account.
3 {A}, via recorded statement.
4 {C}, by second-party report. Early speculations on the cause of the Big
Fire included rumors about a fuel can in a campsite incident; these have
since been clarified in terms of the distinct times and locations, and
dispelled as an explanation.
5 {B}.
6 {D}, phone research with FS & local fire officials.
7 {A}, recorded statement.
8 {E}, via phone discussion. Physical investigation of the fire site
after the fact was hampered, largely because of the thoroughness of the
effort to put it out: Volunteers trampled, dug up, and doused every square
foot of the burn area. Evidence on the ground was entirely disturbed by
the firefight, so arguably it was difficult to draw final conclusions from
available data as to the original cause of the fire, or whether an
accelerant had been used.
9 {D}, direct observations.
10 {B}.
11 Secondary source, to be confirmed.
12 Account provided by {F}; via E-Mail communiques assisted by {F1} (2/17/95).
13 {G}, via verbal & written accounts.
14 {G}, from phone conversations in Jan.-Feb.'95 (2/22/95), relating
account by {E}, who was at the fire with a radio all afternoon.
15 {G} as above, on observations by {H}.
16 {I} hosted the kitchen at Kiddie Village, the large encampment closest
to the blaze. He was scouting the area to make sure outlying tents in that
direction were cleared when he encountered this man who refused to move.
17 "A-Camp" is the single area of the Gathering where alcohol is condoned.
Alcohol is not permitted 'inside' the Gathering, so this encampment is
traditionally located at the perimeter, often near the parking area.
18 {G}. Gatherers do service in the role of "Shantisena", which means
'Peacemaker'. In the lore of the Gatherings, 'We are all Shantisena', with
a shared commitment to resolving problems without violence. However
certain individuals are skilled in crisis intervention, and assume special
responsibilities for security in the gathering.
19 {J}.
20 This information was related by District Ranger Greg Clark (Big Piney
R.D.) in a telephone conversation on January 10, 1995.
21 Mr. Clark described the fire report this way in the conversation cited
above. He subsequently sent a copy, which was received in early February
1995.
22 This letter was received by {K} & {C}. It is attached with the Exhibits.
23 Various people observed this, to be confirmed.
24 {B}.
25 "CALM" is the "Center for Alternative Living Medicine", a tag adopted
by volunteer medics and healers who have served the Rainbow Gatherings for
many years. It is usually set up as a special encampment with emergency
equipment and various medicines, and free care.
26 {B} recorded these statements in a 20-minute taped interview.
27 {B}, and others; to be confirmed.
28 [Fed.Reg, 58:86, 26940]. See information documents attached for
details, in particular: "Constitutional Alert, v2", and "Legal & Land Use
Review/Summary".
29. [Fed.Reg, 59:32, 7880]. A letter from four Senators on the 'Law
Enforcement' rulemaking is attached with the 'Resource Package', the
Chief's 5/18/94 News Release as an Exhibit. Volunteers spoke with USFS
officials in Virginia immediately after the Chief's announcement: They
indicated plans to discard the estimated 70,000 letters received, but were
told that this record must be preserved, and the full Public Comment Log
was requested under the Freedom of Information Act. The Log was never
provided, and it is not known if one was ever prepared.
30 This is why the final rule publication [Fed.Reg, 60:168, 45257;
8/30/95] later resorted to claims that "soil compaction" from foot traffic
was a major impact -- an absurd proposition to anyone knowledgeable about
environmental regulation in general, and the destructive common practices
of the Forest Service in particular.
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Affirmation:
I hereby attest that I prepared the foregoing Report in research &
cooperation with many others, and am responsible for it's contents and
supporting documentation.
I further affirm that this Report truly and accurately represents
personal knowledge and reliable accounts as provided by contributors:
It is prepared to the best of my ability and the highest possible standards,
and submitted in good faith to the Congress of the United States.
Submitted: _______________(signed)_________________ ____6
Oct.'97____
Scott C. Addison, Volunteer (date)
PCU //\ Free Assembly Project
Witnessed: _______________(signed)_________________ ____6
Oct.'97____
Louise M. McKenzie (date)
a Notary for Md.
My comm. expires 12-1-97
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(End, Part 2 of 2)
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