/\_WyFire Report, Pt.1
[ "GATHERING FIRE IN WYOMING (July '94) / Facts & Issues Summary" -- ]
[ Pt.1 of 2: Cover/Contents Page, Foreword, Introduction, and ]
[ Presentation of Facts in 5 areas of Research & Concern. ]
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GATHERING FIRE IN WYOMING
_________________________________________
{Bridger-Teton N.F., 3 July 1994}
* Facts & Issues Summary *
________________________
______________________________________
× A Report on events at the 1994 Rainbow Gathering in Wyoming,
Forest Service conduct and policy impacts on the First Amendment --
presented to responsible Committees of the U.S. Congress. ×
______________________________________
________________________
CONTENTS:
* Foreword
* Introduction
[1] Fire Prep & Prior Incidents
[2] Outbreak of the Big Fire
[3] Forest Service Actions
[4] Paratroopers, Guns, Suspects, No Arrests
[5] The Incident Report
* PERSPECTIVES
Actions & Reactions... The Heat on Volunteers...
Then Nothing Happened... The Regulatory Scheme...
Pretexts for Power... Conclusions
PCU //\ Free Assembly Project
Washington, DC * Chicago, IL
~ September 1997 ~
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** FOREWORD
This "Summary" is a synthesis of assembled facts on the "Big Fire" at
the Wyoming Rainbow Gathering in Bridger-Teton National Forest (July 3,
1994), including key incidents before and after it occurred.
It was researched and prepared at the request of committee staff of
Senator Larry Craig, Chair of the Senate Agriculture SubCommittee
on Forestry, Conservation, and Rural Revitalization:
The topic arose at a meeting in December '94, they wanted the full story,
so PCU volunteers went to work, pulling in accounts from around the
country.
It took a lot of time & effort, endured delays, and suffered limited
resources...
The Summary is now presented as a documented report, tying together direct
observations, testimony by known reliable witnesses, and corroborated
reports.
Care is taken to represent only supported facts and statements, and to
exclude rumors; where a few points of information remain unconfirmed, they
are noted as such.
All the accounts are contributed by individuals on their own behalf,
either as public statements or as personal communiques, with consent to use
the information in this way, and the proviso that it be used accurately.
However witness names are excluded in the text & notes, and replaced by
letter codes ('A', 'B', etc.) for future reference. In this way witnesses
can come forward as a next step -- upon specific requests by Congress for
testimony and/or authorization by the parties involved.
The incidents of the Wyoming Fire are not isolated ... they are part
of a long history of Forest Service actions affecting First Amendment
activities in the National Forests, and the long-term accretion of police
powers in the agency.
When the Forest Service published its 'Law Enforcement' regulations in 1994
[Fed.Reg, 59:32, 7880; 2/16/94], there was overwhelming public opposition,
and Senator Craig took a strong stand against the extreme authorities it
proposed.
That rulemaking was stopped, but chilling police actions persist at public
gatherings.
The Committee staff asked for this story as well. Our original
intent was to present wide-ranging facts on law enforcement impacts at
gatherings in tandem with the 'Big Fire' report, but this information is
on-hold for now:
This is a huge job, there is more hard news all the time, and care must be
observed to protect privacy, and to preserve confidential facts in legal
issues.
We need to assess the info we have, and what is fitting to present,
It is NOT the intent here to limit the scope of Congressional review on
these issues. On the contrary, Federal law enforcement needs maximum
public scrutiny.
The initiative simply refocuses on how to substantiate a broader policy
inquiry, and what will work as a catalyst to responsible action in
Congress.
Our hope is to establish compelling grounds for redress...
For now, let the story of the Wyoming Fire be a decisive first step.
________________________________
This report has been reviewed by contributors and PCU volunteers through
several draft stages, and is presented in this final form with their
consensus.
Nothing here may be construed to represent any other perceived
or alleged "group", or speak for the councils of any gatherings.
The interpretive views ("Perspectives") come from this writer,
informed and advised by the wisdom of many others.
-- S.C. Addison, PCU Volunteer
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/ GATHERING FIRE IN WYOMING \
| --------------------------- |
| {Bridger-Teton N.F., 3 July 1994} |
| |
\ * Facts & Issues Summary * /
* Introduction
With 15-20,000 people assembled at the annual Rainbow Gathering in
Bridger-Teton National Forest (Big Piney R.D.), a large blaze broke out
suddenly at 2 PM in a remote area of the site, threatening to quickly
engulf the north & west sides of the valley.
Volunteers took immediate action to move people to safety and muster
resources:
Medical teams were alerted & ready, and radio communications were set up
quickly.
About 2000 people organized into fire crews and long bucket brigades...
working together in an amazing firefight, after 6 hours the burn was out cold.
Reportedly a Forest Service official later acknowledged that it would
have taken
their crews up to a week to control this fire, with a huge loss of forest
acres.{1}
Instead by the stewardship of assembled Citizens, just over 2 acres were
left charred.
It is an inspiring story with a good ending, but there are serious
questions.
[1] Fire Prep & Prior Incidents
The Summer of '94 was a Long Hot Summer in the West. A long dry
spell had left the high forests ripe for burns, and stories of wildfires
had already hit the news early in the season. In early June when the site
for the Rainbow Gathering was chosen in the Big Piney Ranger District of
Bridger-Teton National Forest, it was recognized that fire would be a
serious concern.
Later that month when seed camp landed, preparations got underway:
Kitchens were advised to have water & tools on-hand, individual campfires
were discouraged, and the "Wyoming Rap 107" sheets given to incoming
gatherers had special information on fire precautions.
On June 30 and again on July 1, volunteers met with Forest Service
and Wyoming State Health and Safety officials in "fire/medical evacuation
councils". Ostensibly they discussed a general strategy for moving people
to the Meadow in event of an emergency, and set up channels of
communication on-site and by radio. The intent was work out the protocols
for cooperating as needed.{2}
The population of the gathering swelled quickly after July 1, with a
rapid influx of new arrivals in an unfamiliar landscape. Many tended to
land briefly in small campsites before settling into kitchen areas and
other community encampments. This was the period of the gathering subject
to the greatest risk of campsite fire mishaps. There were two minor
incidents of this kind.
The first fire incident occurred on the afternoon of July 2, when a
small campfire caught a tree near the Trading Circle; an alarm went up and
it was put out quickly.{3} There was never a major threat of this fire
spreading, but after this preventive efforts were intensified: Volunteers
were active on fire watches around the site, new calls went out to minimize
risks, water buckets were kept filled at kitchens, and only community fires
were allowed. This was the main topic of urgent advisories during
announcements the Main Circle that evening.
The second routine fire mishap occurred at about 10 AM on July 3:
A fuel can was knocked over in a camp outlying from Kiddie Village,
igniting a tarp and a bit of shrubbery; however this was put out quickly
and there was no general alarm in the Gathering. This accident occurred at
a location in the same general area as the big fire -- and it was
acknowledged with apologies from the party involved -- giving rise to
rumors later on that this was the cause. In fact this incident occurred
four hours before the major burn at a campsite a few hundred yards to the
east, and had nothing to do with it.{4}
A third fire erupted at about noon on July 3, setting off the first
alarm of that day: Smoke was billowing from a large tree stump -- again in
the same general area, but on the west side closer to the service road.
This emergency was also brief, as volunteers converged on the site quickly
and smothered the blaze. Here again, this incident is distinct from the
Big Fire two hours later, but its close proximity to that site and the road
may be more than coincidence. Reportedly the Ranger on-hand attributed it
to a carelessly discarded cigarette or match, but this explanation was
questioned by other witnesses.{5}
[2] Outbreak of the Big Fire
Just after 2 PM on July 3rd, another call of "Fire" went out, and was
heard again louder. A council at the far end of the meadow broke up when
smoke was seen billowing up from the hillside at the northwest corner of
the site, about a mile away: This one was clearly serious. People were
suddenly moving everywhere -- to kitchens to muster buckets to the spring,
into the woods to alert those campsites and get them moved to the Meadow,
toward the parking area, etc. Some close at-hand went straight up the gap
to the blaze with tools in hand, to see what was going on & what could be
done.
There were strong indications that the fire was set deliberately.
Likelihood of a camping accident in this location was very slim: It was
remote from the nearest populated area of the site (300-400 yards), with
only a few scattered tents nearby, mostly unoccupied at the time. There
were no other signs of individual campfires in this area -- in accord with
the stringent consensus of the Gathering prohibiting them.
The overall form and character of the fire indicated a
high-flame/low-heat startup; this contrasts with fires from common camping
mishaps, which tend to spread and build heat near the ground, then burn up
the treetrunks into the canopy. Volunteers were familiar with such small
fires (involving a single location or tree) from the three previous
encounters, where they responded at the first sign of smoke, and put them
out quickly before they could spread.{6}
In this instance a huge blaze erupted very fast in the forest canopy,
catching the dry foliage in a number of large trees at once. Again smoke
was detected promptly, but by time the first volunteers arrived flames were
already crowning up to 40 feet above the treetops over an acre area;
initially there was no sign of prior burn in the understory or charring on
the trunks to suggest that flames had spread upward in that manner.
In fact some first-arriving witnesses at the heart of the burn
reported the remains of large logs placed in a triangular bonfire stack,
several courses high.{7} Such a fire built on the ground could easily
have ignited the canopy directly, and further facts support this
explanation. A Vietnam veteran near Kiddie Village said that he recognized
the sound of a primitive incendiary device when the fire started. Traces
of unleaded gasoline were allegedly found in a followup investigation of
the main burn area, but these reports are unconfirmed.{8}
At the early height of the fire a crew was formed to work in the
downwind grove south of the clearing, cutting firelines and extinguishing
hotspots to prevent the fire from spreading across the thickly wooded ridge
that bounded the gathering site on that side. At one point a sudden large
blaze erupted in a single small tree near the tree line, requiring several
people to put it out.
Some were suspicious in that it flared up fast in an area being combed for
the slightest smolders by 15-20 volunteers, and that it occurred after
mounted officers had pushed the first wave of volunteers out of the
clearing.{9}
[3] Forest Service Actions
Initial response by Forest Service Incident Command was confused and
ineffectual. Aside from 3 individual firefighters (2 FS, 1 BLM) who showed
up much later in the afternoon to observe and advise gatherers attacking
the blaze, there was no coordination or support for the efforts on the
ground, especially at the critical early stages. Moreover some actions
were taken apparently to obstruct those efforts.
Mounted USFS Officers showed up near the blaze very quickly after the
outbreak, and were already there when most early volunteers arrived --
ordering crews out of the area, threatening arrests, and breaking up water
lines. They tried to clear the area at least three times during the first
90 minutes of the fire -- first with claims that it was too dangerous, in
the latter instances with false warnings of the arrival of a tanker plane
to drop fire retardant. Volunteers kept returning under threat of arrest.
Between 3:00 and 3:30 PM fire crews were stabilized at the perimeter of the
burn, and steady water supplies were arriving by a bucket line extending
nearly a half mile from the spring at the edge of the Meadow.
While volunteers cut fire lines on the downwind side and began to
surround the fire, the Forest Service still provided no tangible support on
the ground, and did not sustain contact with the volunteers by radio or
other means. Efforts to communicate with Incident Command were
ignored.{10} During this time Officers on horseback were still
interfering with water lines, and others were seen riding around in the
meadow; they made no effort to assist with evacuation or safety measures.
Observers considered their actions generally useless, and their conduct
sometimes menacing.
Meanwhile the slurry bomber still did not arrive from Salt Lake City,
and gatherers were pushing the fire lines forward on all sides. By time
the plane came into radio range, volunteers made contact and advised that
the slurry drop would not be needed: Firefighters were closing in on the
core burn area, and hotspots were already out. The pilot responded that
they had a full load and would drop anyway, but took the suggestion that
the plane do a dry overflight first, so that volunteers would have a chance
to clear the area for the drop.
The plane finally came in at about 5 PM, making a dry pass over the
site, then returning twice to make two drops short of the blaze, at its
south and west perimeters. By then the fire was already well under
control, with a second water line working up the ridge from the north side.
Volunteers then converged on the heart of the burn, and the last hotspots
were dug out and doused by around 8:00 PM.
After a brief council of the volunteers, a firewatch was set up to
remain at the site through that night and continuing thereafter. Forest
Service officials said that a full fire crew would be brought in the
following day to assist with watches and clean-up. Reportedly they arrived
in Big Piney the following night, but never came to the site (ostensibly
because volunteers from the Gathering had the job under control).{11}
[4] Paratroopers, Guns, Suspects, No Arrests
Suspicious incidents and circumstances were reported by reliable
witnesses. It is not assumed that these events are connected to the cause
of the fire -- they are presented only as observed facts. Yet it is
reasonable to infer possible links, which the official investigation failed
to address.
* At 7 AM on or about June 27 '94 an aircraft was heard over the gathering
site, and two parachutes were then observed in descent. They landed on a
peak overlooking the site behind Bus Village, and the witnesses saw a
campfire at the same location a few days later. However no identification
or confirmation was made, as the drop site was too far away to see details
(estimated between 1-2 miles), and access from the area of the gathering
would have been difficult.{12}
* At the outbreak of the big fire on July 3, one of the first volunteers
arriving at the scene saw a white male dressed in black, who reportedly
pulled a silver gun, "fired off a couple of shots" into the trees, and said
something like "That should stir them up". He then went up the hill to the
service road, where he was picked up by a State Police or USFS car, and was
driven away.{13}
A founder of the Gatherings later inquired about this to Forest Service
law officers, and got two different stories: One officer said that
"...there was no guy like that", the second said that they "got the gun."
The officers were standing side-by-side, and contradicted each other.{14}
Possibly related was an observation awhile later in the scene: Another
Rainbow veteran saw a Forest Service officer on horseback with a gun in his
holster, and holding another gun in hand. When asked what he planned to do
with the extra weapon, the officer stuffed it in his belt and gave no
reason for having it; it is surmised that it was recovered in the area.{15}
* More questions center on isolated camp and another armed man in the
"Hawk's Nest" area near the fire, just northeast and downhill toward Bus
Village. This grove had a high concentration of hawk nests, and had been
set aside as a special habitat. Gatherers did not camp in this area, but
there was concern for the hawks when the fire started.
This campsite was occupied before the Gathering by several "mountain
men", as described. Early gatherers asked them to move from the Hawk's
Nest area, but they refused. Apparently one of these men had been left at
this site when the others went to a "rendezvous" somewhere else.
When the fire broke out on July 3, a Gathering elder checked the area
and found the single tent sitting there in sight of the fire, with the same
man inside. The elder spoke with him, advising that this was the only camp
this side of the fire, and that it needed to be moved; he refused to do so
at that time,
saying "Talk to me later", etc.{16}
On the day after the fire (July 4) an experienced volunteer came to
this area and found the camp still in place, and the same man sitting there
by the firepit, which was cold and out of use for days. Asked why he was
still there, the man asked in turn, "Are you gonna help me move my camp?"
The answer was affirmative, and the volunteer talked with him awhile, "Što
find out who this guy was." The man then became suspicious and extremely
hostile, pulled out a gun and made various threats, and then fled through
the woods.
The volunteer followed him about a mile toward Bus Village, where he
apparently cached the gun. Soon thereafter the volunteer saw the man again
on the Main Trail, then the man fled again through the woods toward the
road. Upon arrival he found that the man had been apprehended by gatherers
from A-Camp, and was being held on the road leading into the outside
parking lot.{17} He was then turned over to State Police, who picked him
up there, went back to Bus Village to retrieve the gun, and took him away.
The offender was later seen around the jailhouse badly bruised, and may
have been beaten up by the Police in the car en route from the gathering
site.
On the following day (July 5) the same volunteer made a full report
on this incident to a Forest Service officer in the presence of a
witnessing attorney.{18}
* Another report arose from an incident in Big Piney, as the Gathering was
ending after the first week of July. Two women from the Gathering were in
a local bar when a young white male -- apparently an area local -- was
heard loudly boasting about "burning the hippies out of the woods".
Allegedly this suspect was taken away by police officers, but it is not
known which agency was involved, and a report that he was arrested is
unconfirmed.{19}
In fact several suspects in incidents involving guns and criminal
threats were taken away by police, but nothing is yet known about these
cases. According to the District Ranger, there is no official record of
any fire-related arrests by the Forest Service or other enforcement
agencies.
When asked whether ANY suspects were investigated in connection with the
Fire, he responded that no suspects had been questioned on this, and said
that he had no further knowledge of the above incidents.{20}
[5] The Incident Report
The official Forest Service "Individual Fire Report" (Ref. FSH
5109.14) took no account of the above facts or questions. The event was
dismissed as a routine matter -- in the words of the District Ranger, much
like a 'small brushfire caused by common human error'. It states in its
final remarks:
"FIRE WAS INVESTIGATED AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF LIGHTNING AND NO
DISCERNABLE HUMAN CAUSE EXCEPT SMOKING." No substantial evidence is
presented or referenced as grounds for this conclusion.{21}
The report identifies this incident as the "Rainbow-002" fire and
links it with the Gathering as a major event. It implies that this "minor
incident" arose from carelessness or negligence by the participants.
This is deceptive in itself: There is no evidence to suggest a camping
mishap or any 'common' cause for the fire within the Gathering, while there
are compelling signs of foul play from outside... none of which are
mentioned.
Moreover the Fire Report says nothing of the course of the event, or
the remarkable efforts of the gatherers in putting it out. The District
Ranger issued a letter of thanks to the "Rainbow Family" for the overall
cleanup at the Gathering, but no evidence has appeared that the Forest
Service has acknowledged these facts as a matter of official record.{22}
The Fire may have been the subject of internal reports or
communications, but this information has not been obtained. It is known
that press articles after the event stated that the fire had consumed 11
acres, and that this misinformation had come from Forest Service officials.
Ironically, the same 'Rainbow' letter from the District Ranger told the
truth on 7/29/94, confirming "the size of the July 3 fire... to be about
two acres."
The general public report on the annual Rainbow Gathering --
customarily completed by USFS staff shortly after the event each year --
was incomplete and unavailable when requested the following Spring.
Further requests for the report were made to the Big Piney Ranger District,
USFS Regional headquarters in Milwaukee, and the Teton N.F. Supervisor's
office through early 1996, but it has never been received.
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(End, Part 1 of 2)
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